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Pierre Bourdien, the Centrality of the Social, and the Possibility of Politics
Craig Calhoun1
In the last years of his life, Pierre Bourdieu became an increasingly prominent
public figure. His political writings of the I 990s brought him a wide readership in and
beyond the universities, but also met with a vicious collective backlash from Frenchjournalists and even derision from some academics. Bourdieu’ s fame grew internationally
too, as he challenged neoliberal globalization. If this won new admirers, it also offended
some, especially American academics who didn’t like being associated with his critique
of “the American model”. As his theory predicted, the media made him all the more a
celebrity when he attacked the celebrity-making machine itself in his book, On
Television, which addressed how the media undercut public discourse by reducing it to
“cultural fast-food.”2 Some critics charged that he was participating in this trend rather
than resisting it, writing short essays rather than long and difficult books. Indeed, many
claimed that his new public writings marked a reversal of what he had stood for. And to
some extent the public excitement over Bourdieu the public intellectual eclipsed
engagement with Bourdieu’s scientific work.
Bourdieu was already famous, of course. In June 1968, students had actually
carried copies of his book, The Inheritors, onto the barricades.3 But Bourdieu had stayed
more or less apart from that struggle, turning his attention to scientific—albeit critical--
research. Some of this research produced Homo Academicus, a book partly about the
relationship between the university microcosm and the larger field of power in 1968, but
the book appeared over fifteen years later.4 One reason Bourdieu was not a vocal public
activist in 1968 was that he did not thinlc the crucial issues of power and inequality were
well-joined in the struggles of that year. Neither their romanticism nor the predominant
versions of Marxism appealed to him, and he resisted especially leftist tendencies to
collapse the scientific and political fields. Moreover, he worried that naïve overoptimism
encouraged actions that would set back rather than advance the cause of liberation. Not
least of all, there was a superabundance of symbolically prominent intellectuals in 1968.
By the early 1990s this was no longer so. Sartre and Foucault were both dead, and a
number of others had abandoned the public forum or simply appeared small within it.
The death of Foucault may have been especially important. While Foucault lived,
Bourdieu was in a sense protected from the most intense demands of media and popular
activists for a dominant public intellectual of the left. After Foucault was gone, there was
a sort of vacuum in French public life which Bourdieu was increasingly drax~ to fill.
Bourdieu seized the occasion to fight for undocumented and unemployed workers,
President of the Social Science Research Council and Professor of Sociology and History at New York
University.
2 Bourdieu, On Television. New York: New Press, 1998; orig. 1996.
Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, The Inheritors. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1973;
orig. 1963.
Pierre Bourdien, Homo Academicus. Stanford: Stanford University Press 1988; orig. 1984.
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against the tyranny of neoliberal ideology, and to create a new “International” of public-
spirited intellectuals. He defended the homeless and anti-racist activists. There was
nonetheless an irony, for early in his career Bourdieu had railed against French model ofthe “total intellectual” with its presumption of omnicompetence and its displacement of
more specialized scientific knowledge. The sociologist who had criticized Sartre seemed
to be taking on a Sartrean mantle.
As Bourdieu’s theory suggested, however, public fame is a product of the field
not just the individual and he could not escape it. A wave of strikes in 1995 was pivotal,
not only pitting the government and capitalists against workers but splitting the Left over
whether reformist accommodation to globalization was the best strategy or resistance
made sense. Bourdieu had previously written important reports on education for the
socialist government and participated quietly in the politics at or beyond the left wing of
the socialist party. After malcing what was then a rare appearance at a demonstration at
the Gare de Lyon in 1995, however, Bourdieu took on an increasingly public role. It was
in many ways a transformation of the intellectual and political fields that brought about
the transformation in at least an aspect of Bourdieu’s habitus.
In the present paper, I will attempt to situate Bourdieu’s work in its context(s) anddemonstrate something of its unity, particularly noting its roots in his studies of Algeria
and French educational and cultural institutions. These roots have been somewhat
obscured in American reception of Bourdieu. My main aim, though, is to challenge one
specific claim from the years of academic counterattacks against Bourdieu’s public
interventions. This is the suggestion that his public arguments do not follow from or fit
well with his work in social science. On the contrary, I shall suggest that they follow
closely and fit well with both his theory and his empirical analyses--and indeed that
developing this fit is itself intellectually useful. Bourdieu’s political actions are fully
consistent with and understandably in terms of his scientific sociology, though they were
not dictated by it.
Bourdieu’s challenge to threatened collapse between scientific and economic (andfor that matter, political and economic) fields in the 1990s and early 2000s is of a piece
with his rejection of a collapse between academic and political fields in 1968 and both
are informed by his theory of quasi-autonomous social fields. Further, I shall argue that
Bourdieu’s work should be read in specific relationship to “poststructuralism”; that
though Derrida and Foucault are more conventional exemplars, on purely intellectual
grounds the label “poststructuralist” fits Bourdieu at least as well; and that he represents a
version of poststructuralism more serious about science and social organization than
other lines of work usually grouped under that label. Indeed, the popular
poststructuralism that began to flourish after 1968 as “French theory” spread to America
was, he feared, specifically disempowering to the struggles against neoliberalism. Just as
I 960s-era attacks on the university made it harder to defend the academy from new right-
wing assaults, the poststructuralism (and “postmodernism”) that followed encouraged
denigrations of science and social order and substitutions of identity politics for more
material struggles that weakened those who might resist neoliberalism.
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*To begin with, let us recall the extraordinary scope and distinctive commitments
of Bourdieu’ s work. The most influential and original French sociologist since Durkheim,
Bourdieu was at once a leading theorist and an empirical researcher of broad interests and
distinctive style. While no one would describe Bourdieu’s writings as “easily accessible,”
few social scientists in our era have had a stronger and broader impact in the academic
world as well as on modem culture and society. Bourdieu not only helped redefine the
fields of sociology and anthropology; he made signal contributions also to education,
history, literary studies, aesthetics, and a range of other fields. He analyzed labor markets
in Algeria, symbolism in the calendar and the house of Kabyle peasants, marriage
patterns in his native Bean region of France, photography as an art form and hobby,
museum goers and patterns of taste, modem universities, the rise of literature as a distinct
field of endeavor, and the experience of misery and poverty amid the wealth of modem
societies.
A former rugby player and a reader of the later Wittgenstein, Bourdieu was drawn
to the metaphor of games to convey his sense of social life. But by “game” he didn’t
mean mere diversions or entertainments. Rather, he meant a serious athlete’s
understanding of a game. He meant the experience of being passionately involved in
play, engaged in a struggle with others and with our own limits, over stakes to which we
are (at least for the moment) deeply committed. He meant intense competition. He meant
for us to recall losing ourselves in the play of a game, caught in its flow in such a way
that no matter how individualistically we struggle we are also constantly aware of being
only part of something larger—not just a team, but the game itself. Rugby is one of the
world’s most physically intense games. When Bourdieu spoke of playing, he spoke of
putting oneself on the line.
Social life is like this, Bourdieu suggested, except that the stakes are bigger. Not
just is it always a struggle; it requires constant improvisation. The idea is directly related
to Wittgcnstein’s account of language games.5 These are not diversions from some more
basic reality but a central part of the activity by which forms of life are constituted and
transformed. Learning a language is a constant training in how to improvise ‘play’ in
social interaction and cultural participation more generally. No game can be understood
simply by grasping the rules that define it. It requires not just following rules, but having
a “sense” of the game, a sense of how to play.6 This is a social sense, for it requires a
constant awareness of and responsiveness to the play of one’s opponent (and in some
cases one’s teammates). A good rugby (or soccer or basketball) player is constantly
aware of the field as a whole, and anticipates the actions of teammates, bowing when to
pass, when to try to break free.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. London: 1967; orig. 1953.
6 See Charles Taylor, “To Follow a Rule...” on Bourdieu’s account of the limits of rule-following as an
explication of action and its relationship to Wittgenstein; pp.45-60 inC. Calhoun, E. LiPuma, and M.
Postone, eds.: Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993)..
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In this regard we can, I think, see that Bourdieu’s entry into contestation over
globalization was well timed, and the result of both conscious decision and an
experienced strategist’s sense of how to play the game in a shifting context. There are
different possible approaches to each contest, and to each moment in a contest. What
makes for a good strategy is determined by the rules of the game, of course, but also by
assessing one’s opponent’s strengths and weaknesses—and one’s own. A central strength
of global capitalism is its ability to control the terms of discourse, and most especially, to
present the specific emerging forms of globalization as driven by the force of necessity.
Consider the force of this message in the rhetoric of the European Union and the
advocates of a common currency. Globalization appears as a determinant force, an
inevitable necessity to which Europeans must adapt; capitalism appears as its essential
character; the American model is commonly presented as the ‘normal’ if not the only
model. To assert that the specific pattern of international relations—like relations within
nations—is the result of political choices and the exercise of power is to open up the
game, to remove the illusion of necessity. This is a basic act of critical theory.
Bourdieu came by his critical intellectual orientation naturally, if you will, or at
least biographically. Born in 1930, he was the grandson of an itinerant sharecropper and
son of a farmer who later turned postman in the remote village of Lasseube in the
Pyrénées Atlantiques. From this humble background, he rose through the public school
system. He was at the top of his class at the Lycée de Pau, at the Lycée Louis-le-Grand a
Paris, and at the Ecole Normale Supérieure at the rue d’Ulm, the preeminent institution
for consecration of French intellectuals. But he was never allowed the unselfconscious
belonging of those born to wealth, cultural pedigree and elite accents. At the same time,
he also never confused his success with simple proof of meritocracy (even if it did
demonstrate some degree of grudging openness to the system). Instead, he developed
from it an extraordinary capacity for critical social analysis and epistemic reflexivity.
Bourdieu’s sense of bodily insertion into the competitive and insular universe of
French academe was an inspiration for his revitalization of the Aristotelian-Thomist
notion of habitus, the system of socially constituted dispositions that guides agents in
their perception and action. His awareness of what his classmates and teachers did not
see--because it felt natural to them--informed his accounts of the centrality of doxa—the
preconscious taken-for-granted sense of reality that is more basic than any orthodoxy--
and of misrecognition in producing and enabling social domination. Though educated in
philosophy, Bourdieu embraced sociology precisely in order to make empirical research a
tool for breaking through ordinary consciousness to achieve truer knowledge about a
social world usually considered too mundane for philosophical attention. And his critical
distance from the institutions within which he excelled propelled his telling analyses of
French academic life, and indeed of inequality, the state and capitalism generally.
Bourdieu’s contemporaries and comrades at the École Normale, Jacques Dcrrida
and Michel Foucault, shared this sense of distance from the dominant culture of the
institution. Though the specifics varied, a certain horror at the social environment of the
École informed each in a struggle to see what conventional consciousness obscured.
Indeed, as Bourdieu sometimes reminded listeners, Foucault attempted suicide as a
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student there. Bourdieu’s intellectual response differed crucially from Derrida’s and
Foucault’s: he embraced science, and in opposition to the aristocratic elitism of his initial
field, philosophy, took up the plebian discipline of sociology. Rejecting the “caste
profits” of the philosopher and accepting the challenges of empirical research offered, he
thought, the best means for breaking with the enchantments of established ideas and self-
evident social relations.
*
In 1955, Bourdieu was sent to do military service in Algeria during that French
colony’s struggle for independence—and Republican France’s horrific repression of it.
The bloody battle of Algiers was a formative experience for a generation of French
intellectuals who saw their state betray what it had always claimed was a mission of
liberation and civilization, revealing the sheer power that lay behind colonialism, despite
its legitimation in terms of progress. Bourdieu addressed this both with direct opposition
and with research into the nature of domination itself, including in France, and into the
nature of misrecognition and the struggle over classification.
Confrontation with the Algerian war, and with the transformations wrought by
French colonialism and capitalism, left a searing personal mark on Bourdieu, solidifying
his commitment to the principle that research must matter for the lives of others. Scarred
but also toughened, he stayed on to teach at the University of Algiers and became a self-
taught ethnographer. He proved himself an extraordinarily keen observer of the
interpenetration of large-scale social change and the struggles and solidarities of daily
life. Among other reasons, his native familiarity with the peasant society of Beam gave
him an affinity with the traditional agrarian society of Kabylia that was being destroyed
by French colonialism. With Abdelmalek Sayad, he studied peasant life and participation
in a new cash economy that threatened and changed it.7 Conducting research in Kabyle
villages and with Berber-speaking labor migrants to the fast-growing cities of the
Algeria’s coastal regions, he addressed themes from the introduction of money into
marriage negotiations to cosmology and the agricultural calendar, and the economic crisis
facing those who are forced into market relations for which they are not prepared. He
studied the difficult situation of those who chose to work in the modern economy and
found themselves transformed into its “underclass”, not even able to gain the frill status
of proletarians because of the ethno-national biases of the French colonialists.8
These studies helped forge Bourdieu’ s theory of practice and informed his entire
intellectual trajectory, including both academic endeavors and his later political critique
of neoliberalism. Near the end of his life, he wrote:
As I was able to observe in Algeria, the unification of the economic field tends,
especially through monetary unification and the generalization of monetary
Pierre Bourdieu and Abdelmalek Sayad, Le Déracinement, Ia crise de l’agriculture en Algerie. Paris:
Editions de Minuit, 1964. An exceptional scholar in his own right, Sayad remained a close friend and
interlocutor ofBourdieu’s until his own death in 1998.
Pierre Bourdieu, The Algerians 1962; orig. 1958; Bourdieu, Pierre, Alain Darbel, J-P. Rivet and C. Seibel
(1963/1995) Travail et travailleurs en Algerie. Paris and the Hague: Mouton.
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exchanges that follow, to hurl all social agents into an economic game for which
they are not equally prepared and equipped, culturally and economically. It tends
by the same token to submit them to standards objectively imposed by
competition from more efficient productive forces and modes of production, as
can readily be seen with small rural producers who are more and more completely
torn away from self-sufficiency. In short, unification benefits the dominant.”9
Unification, of course, could be a project not only of the colonial state but also of national
states, the European community, and the World Trade Organization.
It was also in Algeria that Bourdieu learned to fhse ethnography and statistics,
ambitious theory and painstaking observation, and crafted a distinctive approach to social
inquiry aimed at informing progressive politics through scientific production. In some
ways, it may have helped to be self-taught because it encouraged Bourdieu to ignore
some of the artificial oppositions structuring the social sciences—e.g., between
quantitative and qualitative inquiry. Working with Alain Darbel and Abdelmalek Sayad
helped to inaugurate a pattern of intellectual partnership that characterized Bourdieu’ s
entire career. Sociology and anthropology have been slow to institutionalize collaboration
(compared, for example, to the biomedical sciences). The French intellectual field
remains dominated by the charismatic image of the heroic individual genius. But
Bourdieu developed long-term relationships and a support system for shared intellectual
labor. His ethnographic exploration of social suffering in contemporary society, The
Weight of the World, was completed with 22 collaborators (I refrain from listing all
Bourdieu’s co-authors here).
Not least, Bourdieu’s fieldwork in Kabylia—the practical experience as well as
the data--supplied the foundation for his theoretical innovations in the theory of practice
or “social praxeology”.’° One of the most basic difficulties in ethnographic research,
Bourdieu came to realize, is the extent to which it puts a premium on natives’ discursive
explanations of their actions. Because the anthropologist is an outsider and starts out
ignorant, natives must explain things to him. But it would be a mistake to accept such
explanations as simple truths, not because they are lies but because they are precisely the
limited form of knowledge that can be offered to one who has not mastered the practical
skills of living fully inside the culture. Unless he is careful, the researcher is led to focus
his attention not on the actual social life around him but on the statements about it which
his informants offer. “The anthropologist’s particular relation to the object of his study
contains the makings of a theoretical distortion inasmuch as his situation as an observer,
excluded from the real play of social activities by the fact that he has no place (except by
choice or by way of a game) in the system observed and has no need to make a place for
himself there, inclines him to a hermeneutic representation of practices, leading him to
reduce all social relations to communicative relations and, more precisely, to decoding
operations”.’1 Such an approach would treat social life as much more a matter of explicit
cognitive rules than it is, and miss the ways in which practical activity is really generated
“Unifying to Better Dominate,” Items and Issues, winter 2001; orig. 2000.
ID Bourdieu, Outline ofa Theory ofPractice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977; orig. 1972;
and The Logic ofPractice. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990; orig. 1980.
“Outline, p. 1.
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beyond the determination of the explicit rules. Bourdieu’s project was to grasp the
practical strategies people employed, their relationship to the explanations they gave (to
themselves as well as to others), and the ways in which people’s pursuit of their own ends
nonetheless tended to reproduce objective patterns which they did not choose and of
which they might even be unaware.
The resulting studies, culminating in Outline of a Theory of Practice and The
Logic of Practice are among the most influential efforts to overcome the reified
oppositions between subjective and objective, agency and structure. Though Bourdieu
introduced the phrase “structuration” later made famous by Anthony Giddens, his work
was different in two important ways. First, it was always rooted in a reflexive inquiry into
the conditions of possibility of both objective and subjective views, never simply a new
theory of a third way. Moreover, Bourdieu never sought to tackle these issues purely in
the abstract but instead always in struggle to understand concrete empirical cases.
Bourdieu’s studies join with Foucault’s work of the same period in moving beyond
structuralism’s avoidance of embodied subjectivity and with Derrida’s effort to recover
epistemology by breaking with the notion that it must be grounded in the Cartesian
perspective of the individual knowing subject. In an important sense, the imprecise term
“poststructuralist” fits Bourdieu as well it does Foucault or Derrida.
Bourdieu built on structuralism and benefited especially from the work of Claude
Levi-Strauss, who among other things had helped rehabilitate the Durkheimian project of
a science of the relations between culture and social organization and thus sociology as
well as anthropology. Indeed it is actually hard to remember, from this side of Atlantic
and given the way in which the history of social science is typically taught, that the work
of Durkheim had fallen precipitously from prominence after his death and that of Marcel
Mauss. Bourdieu saw himself as in important ways resuming that legacy, even while also
improving on it, and the book series he edited made a variety of works by Durkheim and
his students available that considerably broadened understanding of their project. In
studies like his analysis of the Kabyle house, Bourdieu produced some of the classic
works of structuralism)2 He broke with conventional structuralism, however, as he
sought a way to move beyond the dualisms of structure and action, objective and
subjective, social physics and social semiotics and especially to inject a stronger account
of temporality (and temporal contingency) into social analysis. For this he drew on the
materialist side of Durkheim and Marx; on the phenomenologies of Husserl, Heidegger,
and Merleau-Ponty and later on ethnomethodology (not least the work of his friend
Aaron Cicourel); on Wittgenstein, Austin and post-Saussurian linguistic analysis; on
Ernst Cassirer’s neo-Kantianism (especially The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms) and
Erwin Panofsky’s studies of the history of art and perception; and on the “historical
rationalism” of his own teachers Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem, and Jules
12 Originally written in 1963-4, this was first published as “La maison kabyle ou le monde renversé,” in J.
Pouillon and P. Maranda, eds., Echanges et communications Mélanges offerts a Claude Levi-Strauss a
l’occasion de son 6Oème anniversaire (Paris: Mouton, 1970, pp. 739-58), and republished as part of the
French edition of the Outline, which was entitled Esquisse d’une thdorie de lapratique, précédé de trois
etudes d’ethnologie Kabyle. In the same sense, many of Michel Foucault’s works of the mid-1960s are
arguably classics of structuralism and not yet in any strong sense “poststructuralist”—e.g., The Order of
Things (New York: Pantheon, 1970; orig. 1966).
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Vuillemin.’3 Bourdieu’s effort was not merely to forge a theoretical synthesis, but to
develop the capacity to overcome some of the opposition between theoretical knowledge
based on objectification of social life and phenomenological efforts to grasp its embodied
experience and (re)production in action. Human social action is at once “structured” and
“structuring,” Bourdieu argued, indeed structuring because it is structured, with the
socialized body as “analogical operator of practice.”
Bourdieu railed against false antinomies and the kinds of scholastic oppositions
that serve less to advance scientific knowledge than the careers of those who write
endless theses arguing one side or the other, or proposing artificial syntheses designed
essentially to create a new academic profit niche. The point was not simply to choose
Weber over Marx, or Levi-Strauss over Sartre, but to escape from false dualities and
imposed categories. “Objective analysis,” he wrote in Homo Academicus, “obliges us to
realize that the two approaches, structuralist and constructivist
... are two complementary
stages of the same procedure.”
Likewise, in Outline of a Theory of Practice he analyzed the opposition of
mechanism to finalism, so prominent in the debates over structuralism, as “a false
dilemma”. It is, by the way, a false dilemma that has refused to die. Once familiar to
English-language anthropologists through the debate between Rodney Needham (taking
the structuralist position) and George Homans and David Schneider attacking it on
methodologically individualist grounds, the false dilemma has recurred in recent
metatheoretical arguments occasioned by rational choice theory and so-called “critical
realism”. Mechanisms are all the rage, advocated by Jon Elster and Charles Tilly, backed
up by philosophers of science like Mario Bunge.’4 They promote various ideas of
“mechanism” (usually without considering that their work might be read as
‘mechanistic’) in response to the common interpretative style of ethnographic or
phenomenological work that treats agents’ self-understandings or intentions as
analytically sufficient. B ourdieu would not be altogether unsympathetic, as he pointed
out that methodological objectivism is a necessary moment in all research. But most of
the protagonists in the theoretical debates seek ways to advance causal analysis without
13 Bourdieu’s book series “Le sens commun” (published by Editions d’Minuit) revealed some of the
intellectual resources on which he drew and which he made available in France: The works of Ernst
Cassirer, Gregory Bateson, Erwin Panofsky, Joseph Schumpeter, Mikhail Baktin, Jack Goody, and Erving
Goffitan, among many others, are known in France mainly because of Bourdieu’s efforts. It was the same
series that also helped revive and disseminate knowledge of the works of Durkheim and his heirs Marcel
Mauss and Maurice Halbwachs, whose writings had been virtually effaced from French intellectual
discourse.
‘~ Rodney Needham, Structure and Sentiment (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962); George C. Homans and David M.
Schneider, Kinship, Authority and Final Causes (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955); Jon Elster, Nuts and
Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Charles Tilly, “Mechanisms
in Political Processes,” Annual Review ofPolitical Science, 2001, 4, pp. 21-41; Douglas McAdam, Sidney
Tarow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics ofContention; Mario Bunge: The Sociology/Philosophy Connection
(New Brunswick: Transaction, 1999); Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg, eds., Social Mechanisms: An
AnalyticalApproach to Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). A key question is
whether the emphasis on mechanisms is simply a restatement of Robert K. Merton’s advice to stick to
“middle-range theories” between pure description and grand theoretical systems (Social Theory and Social
Structure, New York: Free Press, 1968; orig. 1957) or is itself part of a more dogmatic metatheory.
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having to pass through the complexities of a theory of practice, usually by treating either
actors’ decisions or structural conditions as in themselves causally efficacious.
When Bourdieu wrote Outline, it was Sartrean existentialism that posited “each
action as a sort of unprecedented confrontation between the subject and the world.”5 For
today’s advocates of explanation by “mechanisms” the fear of a loss of objectivity is
aroused by poststructuralist cultural studies, in which the subject acting in the world may
be less central but the subjective perspective of the observer dramatized. But the
objectifying response—whether in the form of rational choice theory or a more structural
theory—remains problematic if it is conceived as sufficient for science rather than a
moment in a larger process of producing social knowledge. As Bourdieu wrote in
Outline:
In order to escape the realism of the structure, which hypostatizes systems of
objective relations by converting them into totalities already constituted outside of
individual history and group history, it is necessary to pass from the opus
operatum to the modus operandi, from statistical regularity or algebraic structure
to the principle of the production of this observed order, and to construct the
theory of practice, or, more precisely, the theory of the mode of generation of
practices, which is the precondition for establishing an experimental science of
the dialectic of the internalization of externality and the externalization of
internality, or, more simply, of incorporation and objectification.’6
There exists, thus, no simple ‘solution’ to the riddle of structure and agency
(though early on Bourdieu introduced the term ‘structuration’ later made famous by
Anthony Giddens). Rather, their mutual constitution and subsequent interaction must be
worked out in analysis of concrete empirical cases, by reconstituting, first, the social
genesis and makeup of objective social worlds (fields) within which agents develop and
operate, second, the socially constituted dispositions (habitus) which fashion the manner
of thinlcing, feeling, and acting of these agents. This “double historicization” calls for
field and habitus to be related in analysis of specific temporal processes and trajectories.
Moreover, it must be complemented by the historicization of the analytic categories and
problematics of the inquiring scholar. Only in this way can social scientists do the
necessary, if hard, labor of “conquering and constructing social facts”—that is, of
distinguishing the hidden forms and mechanisms of social reality from the received
understandings of previous academic knowledge, folk knowledge and the everyday
preconceptions of “culture” more generally. On this basis, empirically-based reflexive
analysis can also establish the social and epistemological conditions for both the
objective and subjective perspectives themselves, and for avoiding the pitfalls of what
Bourdieu later termed “the scholastic bias” — the tendency of social analysts to project
their own (hermeneutic) relation to the social world into the minds of the people they
observe.’7 Bourdieu’s analyses thus lay the basis for an empirical science that would
u Outline, p. 73.
16 Outline, p. 72.
17 This is discussed in several places; for a general treatment see chapter 6, “The Scholastic Point of View,”
in Practical Reason (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
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address the practices of knowledge at the same time as it produced knowledge of social
practice. The issue remained central in his challenge to neoliberalism:
The implicit philosophy of the economy, and of the rapport between economy and
politics, is a political vision that leads to the establishment of an unbreachable
frontier between the economic, regulated by the fluid and efficient mechanisms of
the market, and the social, home to the unpredictable arbitrariness of tradition,
power, and passions.’8
The production of knowledge structured by such presupposed categories undergirds the
failure to take seriously the social costs of neoliberalism, the social conditions on which
such an economy depends, and the possibilities of developing less damaging alternatives.
Pursuit of such a reflexive grounding for social science was one of the central
motivations for Bourdieu’s sociology of the scientific and university fields.’9 One cannot
understand the stances intellectuals took during the pivotal period of May 1968, for
instance, without understanding both the positions they held within their microcosm or
the place of that intellectual field in the web of symbolic and material exchanges
involving holders of different kinds of power and resources which Bourdieu christened
“the field of power.” This bears not just on political position-taking but on intellectual
work itself It is necessary to use the methods of social science—not merely introspection
or memory—to understand the production of social science knowledge. Bourdieu was
often accused of determinism, as though he were simply expressing a belief in agents’
lack of free will. Much more basically, though, he argued that agency itself was only
possible on the basis of the complex and ubiquitous pressures of social life, and that this
as well as simple exercise of material coercion helped to explain the inertia of power
relations and academic ideas alike. In the context of ‘68, for example, despite his own
critiques of the educational system, Bourdieu was wary of romantic radicalism that
imagined leaping beyond it or beyond inequality at a power at a single jump. This
neglected the way in which institutions actually worked; it posed the risk of making
matters worse by destroying rather than expanding the opportunities offered by the
university system. He worried later that misappropriations of his own analysis of social
reproduction encouraged abandonment of educational standards more than real struggle
to transform education and society to the benefit of the marginalized.
More generally, Bourdieu called for an objective analysis of the conditions of
creativity, and the pressures that resisted it, rather than an idealization of it as a purely
subjective phenomenon. He demanded that social scientists pay scrupulous attention to
the conditions and hence limitations of their own gaze and work—starting with the very
unequal social distribution of leisure to devote to intellectual projects—and continually
objectify their own efforts to produce objective knowledge of the social world. As
Bourdieu made clear, he could not exempt himself from epistemic reflexivity, though like
any other would need to be placed in an intellectual field not analyzed in purely
individual terms. Bourdieu challenged, in other words, the common tendency to
~
“L’imposition du modèle américain et ses effets,” Contre-feux 2, pp. 25-31; p. 29-30.
~ See especially, Bourdieu’s germinal article “The Scientific Field” (1975) and the books Homo
Academicus (1984, tr. 1988) and The State Nobility (1989, tr. 1993).
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propound objective explanations of the lives of others while claiming the right of
subjective interpretation for one’s own.
Bourdieu’s views of the educational system reflected the disappointed idealism of
one who had invested himself deeply in it, and owed much of his own rise from
provincial obscurity to Parisian prominence to success in school. As he wrote in Hoino
Academicus, he was like someone who believed in a religious vocation then found the
church to be corrupt. “The special place held in my work by a somewhat singular
sociology of the university institution is no doubt explained by the peculiar force with
which I felt the need to gain rational control over the disappointment felt by an ‘oblate’
faced with the annihilation of the truths and values to which he was destined and
dedicated, rather than take refuge in feelings of self-destructive resentment”.2° The
disappointment could not be undone, but it could be turned to understanding and
potentially, through that understanding, to positive change.
Educational institutions were central to Bourdieu’s concern, but both his sense of
disappointment and his critical analyses both reached widely. All the institutions of
modernity, including the capitalist market and the state itself, share in a tendency to
promise far more than they deliver. They present themselves as working for the common
good, but in fact reproduce social inequalities. They present themselves as agents of
freedom, but in fact are organizations of power. They inspire devotion from those who
want richer, freer lives, and they disappoint them with the limits they impose and the
violence they deploy. Simply to attack modernity, however, is to engage in the “self-
destructive resentment” Bourdieu sought to avoid. Rather, the best way forward lies
through the struggle to understand, to win deeper truths, and to remove legitimacy from
the practices by which power mystifies itself. In this way, one can challenge the myths
and deceptions of modernity, enlightenment, and civilization without becoming the
enemy of the hopes they offer. Central to this is renewed appreciation of both the
autonomy and distinctive character of the scientific field and of the contributions it can
make to public discourse:
It is necessary today to reconnect with the 191h century tradition of a scientific
field that, refusing to leave the world to the blind forces of the economy, wished
to extend to the whole social world the values of the (undoubtedly idealized)
scientific world.21
*
Bourdieu was part of the poststructuralist movement in the general sense of
incorporating a structuralist starting point but moving beyond it, as well as simply by
generational identity. He shared with other progenitors of poststructuralisrn a suspicion of
purely actor-centered (e.g., Sartrean) accounts of social life and an emphasis on the
centrality of power. His project of a theory of practice was distinct, however, in its claim
to scientific status rather than philosophical-literary critique; in its retention of both
phenomenological and materialist moments largely rejected by the followers of Derrida,
20Homa Academicus, xxvi.
21 Contre-feux 2, p. 8.
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Foucault and Lacan; and in its reflexivity. Bourdicu rejected the widespread reliance on
the metaphor of textuality as an approach to social life, and though he shared an emphasis
on physical embodiment with Foucault, he rejected the tendency to import ideas of an
underlying life-force along with other aspects of Heideggcr and Nietzsche. Dwelling on
the more familiar faces of poststructuralism is usefhl, however, in situating Bourdieu’s
theory and seeing its relationship to his politics. The connections are particularly obscure
to those reading in English, because the pattern of translation and reception made
Bourdieu appear not as a contemporary of Foucault and Derrida, but somehow as the
coming after them.
Poststructuralism is almost by defmition incoherent. It labels, mainly at a
distance, a congeries of predominantly French efforts to move beyond the temporary
certainties of structuralism. Structuralism itself was more a bundle of linked theoretical
positions than a single theory. It joined Levi-Strauss to Althusser, Lacan to Piaget. To
some extent, though, it was a kind of intellectual movement. It reached an apogee in the
1 960s and gave birth to poststructuralism in that moment of its triumph. This was also the
moment in which American reception began in earnest. In anthropology, the importance
of Levi-Strauss brought a significant engagement with structuralism before engagement
with Foucault or Derrida (and in fact, some of Bourdieu’s early work was rightly read as
exemplifying this structuralism). Althusscr influenced Marxists, but not the core of any
academic discipline. To a considerable extent, though, structuralism and
poststructuralism made the Atlantic crossing together. This was perhaps especially true in
literary studies, which were pivotal for the very idea of poststructuralism, and where the
way had been prepared to some extent by the teachings of Paul DeMann. Moreover, in
many fields, “poststructuralist” writings were vastly better known and more influential
than structuralism itself had been—and failure by later generations of students to grasp
the structuralism in poststructuralism produced many misunderstandings. In a sense, in
the American reception, what poststructuralism was “post” to and in tension with varied
among academic disciplines and not surprisingly shaped its appropriation.
Derrida and Foucault were the most influential standard-bearers of what came to
be called poststructuralism, reaching out initially from within the structuralist movement
to embrace other philosophical resources and ideals, such as the work of Nietzsche; to
challenge rationalist certainties with reinstatements of both doubt and irony; and to
suggest that rejecting the philosophy of individual consciousness did not entail rejecting
epistemological inquiry. Their commonalities, like their place at the head of a putative
poststructuralist movement, were less claimed by them than ascribed by appropriators on
the other side of the Atlantic (and the link of poststructuralism to postmodernism can be
similarly confusing). The unity of poststructualism was always dubious, and seldom
important to those acclaimed the central poststructuralist theorists. There were a variety
of paths beyond (as well as within) structuralism.
Most of those labeled poststructuralists, however, shared three refhsals. First, they
shared a rejection of positive politics, most especially the “modem” attempt to build new
political systems or defend political arrangements rather than only to resist power or
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expose inconsistencies, abuses, and aporias.22 Second, they shared a repudiation of—or at
least a disinterest in—the social.23 In a sense, both of these refUsals reflected the
Nietschean heritage of poststructuralism; they reflected Nietzsche’s rejection of a world
of ordinary values and compromises, of the masses and mere existence, and of a morality
of good and evil as the underpinning for a politics of liberation. Third, they rejected
science, viewing it mainly as part of a system of repressive power and not as a potential
source of liberation (a concept usually abandoned with ideas of positive politics).
Bourdieu suggested, in fact, that this was partially a reflection of the very training of the
“core” poststructuralists as philosophy students at the Ecole Normale, and also their
appreciation of the “caste profits” that accrued to those who chose higher status
disciplines (even though both Derrida and Foucault were in marginalized by academic
philosophy, the former gaining influence mainly in literary studies and the latter gaining
position as a historian).
Bourdieu had little patience for the rejection of science recently fashionable
among self-declared critical thinkers. He thought that the “French theory” that claimed
indebtedness to Foucault and Derrida had “much to answer for” on both the scientific and
the political fronts and considered “postmodemism” a “global intellectual swindle” made
possible by the uncontrolled “international circulation of ideas” that gained prestige from
their exotic provenance even while this undermined what should have been the corrective
mechanisms in different intellectual fields. Much of French poststructuralism and
postmodernism derived, thus, from a German Lebensphilosophie opposed to the
historicist rationalism at root of the French social science lineage. While he shared the
view that simple empiricism was liable to reproduce ideologically conventional views, he
argued that the necessary response was not to throw out the baby of science with the
bathwater of positivism and abandon empirical research, but to wield continual collective
vigilance over the classifications and relations through which scientific knowledge was
produced and disseminated—including by state bureaucracies whose categories pigeon
hole human beings for their own purposes while providing social scientists with
apparently neutral data.
The problematic tendencies inherent in French poststructuralism were magnified
in its American appropriation. As in the importation of lebensphilosophie into France, the
export of poststructuralism to America involved both an artificial accretion of prestige an
intellectual decontextualization. The American appropriation was marked by a further
reduction in attention to social relations, partly perhaps because it was led by professors
of literature whose disciplinary formation encouraged focusing on the abstracted text, but
also because of a tendency to underappreciate (Jameson notwithstanding) the marxist
22 This is not to say that they were politically inactive; Foucault, for example, campaigned importantly on
prisons. The point is the reluctance to embrace a positive political project as distinct from resistance.
Perhaps equally indicative is Foucault’s early support for the Iranian revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeni,
which praised precisely its resistance to modernity.
23 It should be granted, though, that if poststructuralism, along with much of the “cultural studies”
movement in English language scholarship, suffered an inattention to the social, a symmetrical lack, or
even repudiation, characterized much of social and political theory and sociology. Those on the other side
from poststructuralism and kindred cultural inquiry often insisted on thin notions of culture and especially
failed to pay much attention to creativity.
13
theory in the background and underpinnings of many poststructuralist theorists.
Poststructuralist theories were conjoined with politics, but seldom with positive rather
than negative political projects (and too often with the illusion of politics that intra
academic insurgency offers). And American poststructuralism eagerly embraced the
critique of science.
All these are crucial reasons why what has come most visibly after
poststructuralism—in both France and the US--is on the one hand a resurgent right wing
populism and on the other variants of liberalism—whether neoKantian or Hayekian—and
a Left both weak and theoretically impoverished.24 Poststructuralism offers scant tools to
contest either the resurgence of a racism transformed into a kind of ethnicism or the
neoliberalism of global capitalist interests. The new right wing politics has attracted few
poststructuralists, and indeed few theorists. It is rooted partly in a populist ressentiment,
but it also builds on some openings poststructuralism helped to create and critical
responses are weakened by some poststructuralist assumptions.
Much academic poststructuralism and postmodernism produced illusions of
radicalism without fact contesting either power structures or the production of suffering.
It involved, in Bourdieu’s terms, “transgression without risk.” As Bourdieu wrote of
Philippe Sollers, the famous founder of Tel Quel and ostensible cultural radical, “The
man who presents and sees himself as an incarnation of freedom has always floated at the
whim of the forces of the field.”25 The phrase could describe not only the particular
individual, but the paradigmatic individual of individualism, unable to recognize the
social conditions of actual freedom, confusing ephemeral novelties with changes in the
underlying field of power. And what Bourdieu suggests is that for all the will to
radicalism in fashionable poststructuralist thought, it more commonly achieves cynicism
and a kind of cultural play that fails to engage deeper social issues. If this is willfully self-
serving in Sollers’ case and a genuine intellectual misrecognition in others’, so much
more reason to seek out a theoretical basis for a more critical intellectual position.
Poststructuralists were the most important enemies of the universalist critique of
hierarchy—sometimes to be sure still resisting hierarchy itself, but abandoning this
foundational position for the resistance. They were also strong celebrants of “difference”.
In the hands of many in the European new right (and some homologues in America and
elsewhere) this combination has issued in a right-wing nationalism and ethnic politics.
However repugnant this is to most poststructuralists and others, it shares a claim to a non-
24 A variety of liberalisms are involved, including both more “left” and more “conservative” neoKantian
positions in France and there especially the variety of academic positions trading on rejections of the
thought of ‘68 (cf. Luc Ferry and Alain Renaud, French Philosophy of the Sixties, Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1990); consider also Lyotard. In America, somewhat similarly, feminists who had
argued largely from poststructuralist positions were often thrown back on liberalism in their efforts to
defend gains against resurgent right wing challengers. This fit with feminism’s close association with
defense of multicultural freedoms, but it often sacrificed the kind of more general and positive social and
political theory earlier linked to socialist-feminism (though see efforts to reclaim the latter project, e.g., by
Nancy Fraser, Justice Interreuptus. New York: Routledge, 1996).
25 Sollers, Bourdieu said, made “cynicism one of the Fine Arts”. Acts ofResistance (New York: New Press,
1998), 12.
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hierarchical construction of difference as the basis for both celebrations of self-identity
and politics of exclusion. As Taguieff has argued, this new “differentialist racism” has
produced confusion in the anti-racist camp, because it has reduced the purchase of
traditional anti-racist arguments while introducing a new racism that can appropriate the
terms of the poststructuralist discourse of difference and resistance to universalism.26
There is clearly an irony in seeing celebration of difference turn into a racist reaction to
it.
Equally ironically, and even more centrally perhaps, the poststructuralist politics
of resistance has turned into an outright liberalism for some, and undercut resistance to
dominant liberalism for others. This is ironic, because most versions of liberalism
depend, for example, on presumptions of individual subjects strikingly at odds with
poststructuralism’s deconstructions and analyses of the production of subjects by
disciplinary power. Similarly, poststructuralists often affirmed a polymorphous creativity
at odds with the role of neoliberalism in support of the disciplining labor for global
consumption. There is perhaps a closer and less ironic link between the celebration of
consumer culture by many postmodernists (in ways not really inherently poststructuralist)
and the neoliberal argument that consumer choices are a good measure of freedom. In
any case, many whose primarily political instincts were simply to resist authority have
found themselves unable to resist the seductions of an ideology that sees free
movement—free play!—of capital as a prime instance of resistance to authority.27 It is
now hard to find a way out of oppositions between a racism and nationalism dressed up
in new differentialist colors, and a neoliberalism in which the liberties of capital dominate
over any positive conception of human freedom. Whatever its contributions, most
versions of poststructuralism offer little help in the search for an escape from this
frustrating forced choice.
For many who have been influenced by poststructuralism, simply shoring up
liberalism appears as the best choice—protecting civil liberties, for example, as a way of
protecting differences among subjects. To some extent this reflects simply the extent to
which the left was thrown on the defensive, hoping to preserve various freedoms during
the rise of the new right. But there was also an elective affinity between poststructuralism
and the abandonment of projects more directly engaging state power or seeking structural
change in social relations. At the same time, many followers of poststructuralism, in
America at least, tended to substitute academic politics for ties to social movements
26 See Pierre-Andre Taguieff, The Force ofPrejudice: On Racism and its Doubles (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 2001).
27 One of the many ironies of U.S. politics in the 1980s was that many who saw themselves as radical
critics of the established order identified with poststructuralism and with an academic politics in which
more old-fashioned leftists (including marxists, especially of an older generation) were the would-be
authorities to be resisted as often as extra-academic authorities of the right. To speak of the social, or of
basic structures of capital, was in many circles seen as a retrograde attempt to enforce old views that stood
condemned as repressive and—perhaps worse—boring. What this meant was that opportunities for a
fruitful melding of marxist and poststructuralist insights were often lost, or at least deferred. Indeed, the
image of poststructuralism in the U.S. tended often to present French poststructuralists as more clearly
opposed to marxism (and structuralism) than was in fact the case. The structuralism and (often structuralist)
marxism incorporated into many of the classics of poststructuralism was underestimated—making works
like Derrida’s Specters ofMarx (New York: Routledge, 1994) more surprising than they should have been.
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beyond the universities. Feminism, for example, was once a remarkable demonstration of
how academic intellectual work and broad social movement could be joined, but the link
was largely severed in the era of poststmcturalist predominance. To some extent, this was
not the fault of poststructuralism but of larger movement and political dynamics. The
dominant forms of poststructuralism, though, were particularly prone to what Bourdieu
called the “scholastic fallacy,” to attributing the problems of theoretical understanding to
people not engaged in theory as such, and thus to imagining that academic contestation
over cultural issues was the same as practical politics rather than a potentially useful
complement to it. Poststructuralist theory did offer useful complements—including its
emphasis on difference and the problems with universalism—but not a viable alternative.
Fights between marxists and poststructuralists, moreover, tended to crowd out other
traditions of critical social analysis—including for example the approaches offered in
France by Mauss and Merleau-Ponty, both part of a tradition Bourdieu sought to
revitalize.
Not all features of liberalism are problematic, of course, but liberalism without a
strong theory of social relations and social practice is in a remarkably weak position to
contest the “neoliberalism” that makes the abstracted individual the ground of all analysis
and the economic the primary measure of this individual’s well-being. This neoliberalism
is the dominant ideology of the day. Mounting an effective challenge to it, and moving
beyond the idea that it is the only available alternative to the new racism and nationalism,
depends on revitalizing the idea of the social and overcoming debilitating oppositions
between the social and the economic, the social and the individual, and the social and the
cultural. Not least of the importance of Bourdieu’s work, then, is suggesting a truly
sociological way to incorporate the gains of poststructuralism, but transcend its
weaknesses.28 Most versions of liberalism, by contrast, represent a continued retreat from
the social.
In order to contest neoliberal orthodoxy and the paradoxical collapse of much
poststructuralism into it, we need to inquire into the very construction of “the social”—
that is, of human life understood relationally. Bourdieu’s theory is not the last word on
this, but is a crucial starting point for investigating how the social is built and rebuilt in
everyday practice, and how the basic categories of knowledge are embedded in this.
Bourdieu’s work at its most basic is a challenge to false oppositions: the interested and
disinterested, the individual and the collective, and the socio-cultural and the economic.29
“A presupposition which is the basis of all the presuppositions of economics” is that “a
radical separation is made between the economic and the social, which is left to one side,
abandoned to sociologists, as a kind of reject.”3° This in turn undergirds “a political
vision that leads to the establishment of an unbreachable frontier between the economic,
28 On this point, and also the relationship of both Bourdieu and other poststructuralist arguments to critical
theory, see Calhoun, Critical Social Theory: Culture, History, and the Challenge ofDjfference (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1995).
29 Bourdieu’s emphasis has been especially on the separation of the economic from both the social and the
cultural, but the opposition of the latter two can be equally pernicious, as in specious ideas of division of
labor between sociology and anthropology in the US, or the construction of “sociology of culture” within
American sociology—rather than, say the “cultural sociology” of central Europe.
30Acts ofResistance, p.31.
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regulated by the fluid and efficient mechanisms of the market, and the social, home to the
unpredictable arbitrariness of tradition, power, and passions.3’ Economics is able to claim
a falsely asocial (and acultural) individual subject, and the social (including culture) is
posited as the non-economic realm (the realm at once the economically unimportant and
of the pure aesthetic--never a true commodity but claimable only after the fact as an
economic good). When the production of knowledge is structured by such presupposed
categories failure to take seriously the social costs of neoliberalism, the social conditions
on which such an economy depends, and the possibilities of developing less damaging
alternatives is almost inevitable.
*
Bourdieu’s engagement with “the social” was not simply a theoretical position but
the product of an acute interest in social inequality and the ways in which it is masked
and perpetuated. At once personal and political as well as scientific, this concern was
appropriately evident in his studies of intellectual production and its hidden
determinations. More generally, it underpins his account of the forging, conversion and
communication of “cultural capital” and the operation of “symbolic power”—a central
theme of his career. Already prominent in his work on Algeria, this concern became even
more prominent when he turned his attention to France, notably in studies of matrimonial
strategies and gender relations in his native Beam during the early 1960s.32
In 1964, Bourdieu published The Inheritors, the first of several ground-breaking
studies of schools, cultural distinction and class division, soon followed by Reproduction
in Education, Culture, and Society (both collaborations with Jean-Claude Passeron). The
latter outlines a theory of pedagogical work as an exemplar of “symbolic violence”. This
concept reflects Bourdieu’ s structuralistlpoststructuralist heritage, referring to the
imposition of a “cultural arbitrary” that is made to appear neutral or universal.33 Both
books examined the ways in which seemingly meritocratic educational institutions
reproduced and legitimated social inequalities, for example by transforming differences
in family background or familiarity with bourgeois language into differences in
performance on academic tests. Read in English narrowly as texts in the sociology or
anthropology of education, they were also more general challenges to the French state,
which embraced education more centrally than its counterparts in the English-language
countries. The national education system stood as perhaps the supreme exemplar of the
pretended seamless unity and neutrality of the state in simultaneous roles as
representative of the nation and embodiment of reason and progress. Bourdieu showed
not merely that it was biased (a fact potentially corrigible) but that it was in principle
biased. This was read by some as a blanket condemnation, and indeed Bourdieu himself
31
“L’imposition du modele américain et ses effets,” Contre-feux 2, pp.25-3!; p. 29-30.
32 Bourdieu published several articles on these themes, and left a more extended, book-length treatment, Le
.Bal des célibataires, in press at his death.
~ The Inheritors, with Jean-Claude Passeron. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979; orig. 1964;
Reproduction in Education, Culture, and Society, with Jean-Claude Passeron. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977;
orig. 1970.
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worried later that this loose reading of his work encouraged teachers simply to adopt lax
standards in order not to be seen (or see themselves) as the agents of symbolic violence.
The heavy emphasis of the early works on demonstrating the tendency of the
educational system to reproduce its own internal hierarchy and the external material and
symbolic hierarchies of the larger social order encouraged readers to the distorting
simplification of seeing the studies as merely arguments that “education is a process of
reproduction”. In fact, Bourdieu did not deny the progressive possibilities of education—
albeit in need of reform—and he certainly saw science as potentially liberating.34 The
issue was more that a particular system of categories, contents, and outcomes was
presented as necessary and neutral (and one senses Bourdieu’ s outrage at professors who
can’t see the system reflexively and critically even while he explains their complacency
and incapacity). Forming the taxonomic order of both the way academics thought and the
way the system was organized, it was impressively protected against internal critique and
therefore successful reform and improvement. As he wrote later,
The homology between the structures of the educational system (hierarchy of
disciplines, of sections, etc.) and the mental structures of the agents (professorial
taxonomies) is the sources of the functioning of the consecration of the social
order which the education system performs behind its mask of neutrality.35
In short, the education system is a field. It has a substantial autonomy, which it must
protect, and a distinctive form of capital which depends on that autonomy for its efficacy.
It is internally organized as a set of transposable dispositions and practical taxonomies
that enable participants to understand theft world and to take effective actions, but which
also produce and reproduce specific inequalities among them and make these appear
natural. These can be challenged—as indeed Bourdieu challenged them by analyzing
them—but it should not be thought that they could be easily changed by a simple act of
will. And it is externally productive, providing the larger field of power with one of its
most powerful legitimations through the process of the conversion of educational capital
into more directly economic, political, or other forms.
Here we see again the dialectic of incorporation and objectification to which
Bourdieu referred in the passage quoted above from Outline. The education system
depends on the inculcation of its categories as the mental structures of agents and on the
simultaneous manifestation of these as material structures of organization. This enables
the production of objective effects that do not cease to be objective and materially
powerful simply by pointing to the subjective moments in their creation. It is true that
there is “symbolic aggression observable in all examination situations” (and Bourdieu
goes to great lengths to document and analyze such things as the terms teachers use in
commenting on examination papers) but not that this is explicable simply as the
psychological attitude of individual agents. Rather, it is a disposition inculcated by
agents’ own trajectories through the educational field (as students as well as teachers) and
~ For decades he quietly supported students from Kabylia in the pursuit of higher education, a fact that
speaks not only to his private generosity and sense of obligation, but to his faith that, for all their complicity
in social reproduction, education and science remain our best hope for loosening the yoke of domination.
~
“The Categories of Professorial Understanding,” p.2O4; originally published in 1978, this is reprinted as
a postscript to Homo Academicus, 1988; orig. 1984.
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both reproduced and rendered apparently neutral by its match to the categories of
organization and value in the field as a whole.36
More generally, the social order is effectively consecrated through the educational
system because it is able to appear as neutral and necessary. In one of Bourdieu’s favorite
metaphors for describing his own work, the Maoist notion of “twisting the stick the other
way”, he turned the structuralist analysis of taxonomies in another way by mobilizing it
through an account of practice in the context of fields. And the analysis of how the
culturally arbitrary (and often materially unequal) comes to appear as natural and fair
directly informed his later critique of the imposition of neoliberal economic regimes and
the American model of dismantling or reducing state institutions, including those like
education that do provide opportrmities for ordinary people even while in their existing
form they reproduce distinctions like that of ordinary from extraordinary.
Just as Marx argued that capitalism produced wealth that it could not effectively
distribute to all its participants, Bourdieu argued that science and education do in fact
produce and reproduce knowledge but do so inseparably from inequalities in capacity and
opportunity to appropriate that knowledge.
Economic power lies not in wealth but in the relationship between wealth and a
field of economic relations, the constitution of which is inseparable from the
development of a body of specialized agents, with specific interests; it is in this
relationship that wealth is constituted, in the form of capital, that is, as the
instrument for appropriating the institutional equipment and the mechanisms
indispensable to the functioning of the field, and thereby also appropriating the
profits from it.37
It would make no sense to start socialism—or any more egalitarian society—by willfully
abolishing all the material wealth accumulated under capitalism and previous economic
systems. But it would be necessary to transform the system of relations that rendered
such wealth capital. Likewise, knowledge as a kind of resource deployed by those with
power in relation to specific fields—legal, medical, academic--constitutes a specific form
of capital. But knowledge need not be organized this way.
Bourdieu’s exploration of the operation of different forms of power blossomed
into a full-fledged model of the relations between economic, cultural, social and symbolic
capital in the deployment of strategies of class reproduction. This perhaps reached its
36
“The Categories of Professorial Judgment” ends with an illustration of the workings of fields that is also
a comment on the aristocratic side of the fashionable Heideggerianism of the poststructuralist era:
These generic dispositions are in fact made specific by the position held by each reader in the
university field. We see, for instance, what the most common reading of the classical texts (0
Epicurean garden) may owe to the virtues of provincial gardeners, and what ordinary and
extraordinary interpretations of Heidegger may owe to that aristocratic asceticism which, on forest
path or mountain pass, flees the flabby, vulgar crowds or their concrete analagon, the continually
renewed (bad) pupils who have to be endlessly saved from the temptations of society in order to
inculcate in them the recognition of true value. (p. 225)
See also Bourdieu, The Political Ontology ofMartin Heidegger (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991;
orig. 1988, where field analysis is used to understand Heidegger himself.
~ Outline, pp. 184-5.
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flullest development in his study of the grands écoles and the political and economic
power structure of the elite professions, The State Nobility.38 The studies of education
were part of a broader approach to culture and power that drew also on a series of
influential empirical studies of art and artistic institutions starting in the I 960s.39 In
addition to the book-length works on education and art, Bourdieu published extensive
shorter studies of the religious, scientific, philosophical, and juridical fields. In these and
other investigations, he laid the basis for a general theory of “fields” as differentiated
social microcosms operating as spaces of objectives forces and arenas of struggle over
value which refract and transmute external determinations and interests. His deepest and
most sustained work on fields, as well as his most historical research, focused on
literature and was capped by The Rules ofArt, an investi~ation of the symbolic revolution
wrought in literature by Flaubert, Baudelaire and others. ° Bourdieu’s greatest unfinished
work is probably its companion study, a sociogenetic dissection of Manet and the
transformation of the field of painting in which he played a pivotal role.
This line of work is most widely known, however, through Distinction, almost
certainly Bourdieu’s most prominent book in English.4’ Distinction is an analysis of how
culture figures in social inequality and how the pursuit of distinction or differential
recognition shapes all realms of social practice. It is also an effort to “move beyond the
opposition between objectivist theories which identify the social classes (but also the age
or sex classes) with discrete groups, simple countable populations separated by
boundaries objectively drawn in reality, and subj ectivist (or marginalist) theories which
reduce the ‘social order’ to a sort of collective classification obtained by aggregating the
individual classifications or, more precisely, the individual strategies, classified and
classifying, through which agents class themselves and others.”42 Bourdieu develops,
thus, an argument that struggles over classification itself are an important and largely
ignored aspect of class struggle (suggesting in the process that class struggle has hardly
become obsolete). That classification is materially efficacious may be a familiar idea
from the structuralist heritage; that it is an exercise of political power and potentially
challengeable by a political—and also cultural—struggle is more in keeping with
“poststructuralist” arguments (though Bourdieu’s notion of power alwayshad more to do
with agents wielding and benefiting from it than, say, Foucault’s).
Distinction, however, is also crucially a response to Kant’s Third Critique (and to
subsequent philosophical disquisitions on judgment). Much as Durkheim had sought to
challenge individualistic explanation of social facts in Suicide, so Bourdieu sought in
Distinction to uncover the social roots and organization of all forms of judgment. Kant’s
argument had sought an approximation in practical reason to the universality available
38 Bourdieu, The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field ofPower. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1996; orig. 1989.
~ See Photography: A Middle-Brow Art (with Luc Boltanski, Robert Castel, Jean-Claude Chamboredon
and Dominique Schnapper). Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990; orig. 1965; The Love ofArt (Alain
Darbel and Dominique Schnapper). Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990; orig. 1966
40 The Rules ofArt. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996; orig. 1992.
41 Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique ofthe Judgment of Taste. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1984; orig. 1979.
42 Distinction, p. 483.
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more readily to pure reason. He had seen this as crucial equally to artistic taste and
political opinion. But he had imagined a standpoint of disinterested judgment from which
practical reason (and critique) might proceed. Bourdieu clearly accepted the analogy
between art and politics, but not this idea of disinterest or of a place outside social
struggles from which neutral knowledge might issue. If he shared this critique of
ostensible neutrality with Foucault and other more conventional poststructuralists, he
differed importantly in arguing that knowledge not only buttresses the hierarchies of the
social world but also can be an effective part of the struggle to change that world, even if
it is never produced from a standpoint outside it. The world-as-it-is-perceived issues out
of and bolsters the world-as-it-is, a struggle over classification may actually change the
world, and—this was crucial for Bourdieu—that struggle need not be simply a matter of
power but can be through science a matter of knowledge which transcends mere power
even if it does not escape struggles over power and recognition altogether. In short, we
needn’t go down the Nietzschean path towards a choice between simple embrace of the
will to power or a futile resistance to it.
We can refuse relativism even though we cannot escape social relations. And if
many of the poststructuralists failed to avoid relativism, they also failed to recognize the
system of social relations in which they remained embedded, including the quasi-
aristocratic system of the university (and especially in the French case, the philosophy-
centered production of this aristocratic system).
Failing to be, at the same time, social breaks which truly renounce the
gratifleations associated with membership, the most audacious intellectual breaks
of pure reading still help to preserve the stock of consecrated texts from becoming
dead letters, mere archive material, fit at best for the history of ideas or the
sociology of knowledge, and to perpetuate its existence and its specifically
philosophical powers by using it as an emblem or a matrix for discourses which,
whatever their stated intention, are always, also, symbolic strategies deriving their
power essentially from the consecrated texts. Like the religious nihilism of some
mystic heresies, philosophical nihilism too can find an ultimate path of salvation
in the rituals of liberatory transgression. Just as, by a miraculous dialectical
renewal, the countless acts of derision and desacralization which modern art has
perpetrated against art have always turned, insofar as these are still artistic acts, to
the glory of art and the artist, so the philosophical ‘deconstruction’ of philosophy
is indeed, when the very hope of radical reconstruction has evaporated, the only
philosophical answer to the deconstruction of philosophy.43
Philosophy is like art in claiming a certain disinterested distance from the economy but in
fact contributing the reproduction of the social order. Both also specifically deny the
centrality of the social, not only in terms of the institutions in which they flourish but in
the necessary distinction between merely intellectual and truly social breaks with the
established order.
If philosophy and art operate with a denial of interest, economics and less
academic discourses about economic matters clearly embrace interest. But they operate
with a presumption of neutrality and objectivity that renders them vulnerable to a closely
‘~ Distinction, p. 496.
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related critique. For if the cultural world is the economic world reversed, as Bourdieu
famously put it,44 it is also true that liberal economics turns precisely on the denial of
cultural significance, the positing of “interests” as objective, and the perception of
economic systems as matters of necessity rather than products of choice and power (and
therefore potentially to be improved by struggle). There is no disinterested account of
interests, no neutral and objective standpoint from which to evaluate policy, not even
academic economics. But this doesn’t remove economic matters from science, it simply
extends the demand for a truly reflexive social science, and for an overcoming of the
oppositions between structure and action, objective and subjective to economics and
economic analysis. The economy has no more existence separate from or prior to the rest
of society than do art or philosophy. It is not ‘necessity’ to which we may only adapt any
more than artistic creativity is simply ‘freedom’ with no social base.
*
Bourdieu’s approach was to rethink major philosophical themes and issues by
means of empirical observation and analyses rooted in “a practical sense of theoretical
things” rather than through theoretical disquisition.45 Science—including sociology and
anthropology—was for him a practical enterprise, an active, ongoing practice of research
and analysis (modus operandi), not simply a body of scholastic principles (opus
operatum). It was no accident that he titled his book of epistemological and
methodological preliminaries The Craft ofSociology.46 The craft worker is always a lover
of knowledge; the craft itself is precisely a store of knowledge, yet it is never fully
discursive and available for explicit transmission as such. Masters teach their skills by
example and coaching, knowing that know-how cannot be reduced to instructions, and
never escapes its situated and embodied character. Like habitus, “the rules of art” is a
phrase that signifies practical knowledge, learning-by-doing, tacit understanding, like the
knowledge of cooking embodied in a grandmother’s demonstrations and guidance rather
than a cookbook. Art can never be reduced to following set rules and yet to say it is
without coherence, strategy or intention or not based on social organized and shared
knowledge would be to misunderstand it utterly. Neither is science simply the value-free
expression of “truth.” It is a project, but one organized, ideally, in a social field that
rewards the production of verifiable and forever revisable truths—including new truths
and new approaches to understanding--and not merely performance according to explicit
~ “The Field of Cultural Production, or: The Economic World Reversed,” pp. 29-73 in The Field of
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rules and standards. It is a project that depends crucially on reason as an institutionally
embedded capacity, and therefore refuses equally the rationalistic reduction of reason to
rules, simple determinism’s unreasoned acceptance of the status quo, and the expressive
appeal to insight supposedly transcending history and not corrigible by reason.
Indeed, it was as a scientist that Bourdieu in the last years of his life turned to
analyze the impacts of neoliberal globalization on culture, politics, and society. Though
he was accused of simply adopting the mediatic throne Sartre and Foucault had occupied
before—and certainly he never fully escaped from that mediatic version of politics--he
offered a different definition of what a “public intellectual” might be. Citing the
American term, he writes of “one who relies in political struggle on his competence and
specific authority, and the values associated with the exercise of his profession, like the
values of truth or disinterest, or, in other terms, someone who goes onto the terrain of
politics without abandoning the requirements and competences of the researcher”.47 Even
in the tradition of Zola, it was important to recognize the difference between becoming a
politician and speaking in public as an intellectual.
Basic to Bourdieu’s interventions as a public intellectual, in this sense, was the
importance of creating the possibility of collective choice where the dominant discourse
described only the impositions of necessity. In the context of the Yugoslav wars of the
I 990s, for example, Bourdieu challenged the idea that the choices of European citizens
were limited to passivity before the horrors of ethnic cleansing or support for the
American-led NATO policy of high-altitude bombing. More prominently, he challenged
the neoliberal idea that imposition of the “American model” was a necessary response to
globalization (itself conceived as a quasi-natural force). This American model he
identified with five features of American culture and society which were widely proposed
as necessary to successful globalization in other contexts: (1) a weak state, (2) an extreme
development of the spirit of capitalism, and (3) the cult of individualism, (4) exaltation of
dynamism for its own sake, and (5) neo-Darwinism with its notion of self-help.48
Bourdieu was concerned above all that the social institutions that supported
reason—by providing scholars, scientists, artists, and writers, with a measure of
autonomy--were under unprecedented aftack. Reduction to the market threatened to
undermine science; reduction to the audience-ratings logic of television entertainment
threatened to undermine public discourse. The problem was not internationalization as
such. Bourdieu himself called forcefully for a new internationalism, saw science as an
international endeavor, and founded Liber, a European review of books published in six
languages. The problem was the presentation of a particular modality of “globalization”
as a force of necessity to which there was no alternative but adaptation and acceptance.
Calling this the American model annoyed Americans who wished to distance themselves
from government and corporate policies but capturing with this label a worldwide trend
toward commodification, state deregulation, and competitive individualism exemplified
~
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and aggressively promoted by the dominant class of the United States at the end of the20th century.
Whatever the label, Bourdieu meant the view that institutions developed out of a
long century of social struggles should be scrapped if they could not meet the test of
market viability. Many of these, including schools and universities, are state institutions.
As he had demonstrated in much of his work, they were far from perfect. Nonetheless,
collective struggles had grudgingly and gradually opened them to a degree to the
dominated, workers, women, ethnic minorities, and others. These institutions and this
openness are fragile social achievements that open up the possibility of more equality and
justice, and to sacrifice them is to step backwards, whether this step is masked by a
deterministic analysis of the “market” or a naked assertion of self-interest by the wealthy
and powerfifi. This does not mean that defense must be blind, but it does mean that
resistance to neoliberal globalization, even when couched in the apparently backward-
looking rhetoric of nationalism, can be a protection of genuine gains and indeed, a
protection of the public space for further progressive struggles.
In his own life, Bourdieu recognized, it was not merely talent and effort that
propelled his extraordinary ascent from rural Beam to the College de France, but also
state scholarships, social rights, and educational access to the closed world of “culture.”
This recognition did not stop him from critical analysis. He showed how the
classificatory systems operating in these institutions of state, culture, and education all
served to exercise symbolic violence as well as and perhaps more than to open
opportunities. But he also recognized the deep social investment in such institutions
necessarily inculcated in people whose life trajectories depended them: “what individuals
and groups invest in the particularly meaning they give to common classificatory systems
by the use they make of them is infinitely more than their ‘interest’ in the usual sense of
the term; it is their whole social being, everything which defines their own idea of
themselves...”49
Neoliberal reforms, thus, not only threaten some people with material economic
harms, they threaten social institutions that enable people to make sense of their lives.
That these institutions are flawed is a reason to transform them (and the classificatory
schemes central to their operation and reproduction). It is not a basis for imagining that
people can live without them, especially in the absence of some suitable replacements.
Moreover, the dismantling of such institutions is specifically disempowering, not only
economically depriving. That is, it not only takes away material goods in which people
have an “interest”, it undercuts their ability to make sense of their social situation and
create solidarities with others.
Especially from the early 1990s, Bourdieu worked to protect the achievements of
the social struggles of the twentieth century -- pensions, job security, open access to
higher education and other provisions of the social state -- against budget cuts and other
attacks in the name of free markets and international competition. In the process, he
‘~ Distinction, p. 478.
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became one of the world’s most famous critics of neoliberal globalization.50 Indeed,
Bourdieu became remarkably famous, not least after Pierre Caries’ documentary movie
on his political work, Sociology Is a Martial Art, was a surprise commercial success in
2000-2001. Theater groups staged performances based on his ethnographic exploration of
social suffering, La misère du monde.5’ It was this fame that brought forth the criticism
and resentment of many of his colleagues and a variety of cultural commentators.
It is easy to see how celebrity can fuel jealousy among intellectuals. To this we
must add the special complexities of the French intellectual field and Bourdieu’s place
within it. His chair at the College de France gave him a symbolically preeminent but
materially marginal position. He could not effectively place all his protégés. Moreover,
though he resisted (and sometimes fiercely denied) becoming one of the “mandarins” of
the French system, its structural constraints insistently asserted themselves: to achieve
personal autonomy, several of Bourdieu’s early students and collaborators felt it
necessary to go through painful rebellions. A few could not restrain themselves from
publicly expressing their quasi-Oedipal struggles in newspaper commentary after
Bourdieu’s death. And yet, perhaps the greatest source of resentment against Bourdieu
was his refusal to turn his own success
— in the intellectual world, on the political scene,
and in the media -- into an endorsement of the system and thus of all those honored by it.
On the contrary, Bourdieu was relentlessly critical of the consecration function performed
by educational institutions. By implication, many felt deconsecrated.52
Bourdieu’s public interventions were, however, firmly rooted in his sociological
analyses. Indeed, it was his theory of social fields—honed in studies of the religious field,
the legal field, and the field of cultural production--that informed his defense of the
autonomy (always only relative) of the scientific field from market pressure. His theory
of the multiple forms of capital—cultural and social as well as economic—suggested that
these were indirectly convertible but if they were reduced to simple equivalence cultural
and social capital lost their specificity and efficacy. And his early studies in Algeria
showed the corrosive impact of unbridled extension of market forces.
Bourdieu knew the political importance of science, but also that this importance
would be vitiated by reducing science to politics. In Pantagruel, Rabelais famously said,
“Science without conscience is nothing but the ruin of the soul.” It is a better line in
French, where ‘conscience’ also means consciousness.53 It is not the sort of line Bourdieu
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would quote, though, because public appeals to conscience are too commonly
justifications for a jargon of authenticity rather than the application of reason. But
Bourdieu demonstrated that conscience—in both its senses--is not simply an interior state
of individuals. It is a social achievement. As such, it is always at risk. Bourdieu was a
scholar and researcher of great rigor and also a man and a citizen with a conscience
attuned to inequality and domination. Would there were more.
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